



Adapting economics to climate change adaptation

International Climate Change Adaptation Conference

Amar Breckenridge

29 June 2010

Introduction: key question

- What is the best use of society's resources given projected climate change impacts?

Efficiency

- At the margin, social costs and benefits of adaptation are equal

Equity

- Distributional consequences of impacts and adaptive measures

Text

Text

Text


Text

Text

Text

Text

The standard framework



Drawbacks with the standard approach

Assumed view of adaptation

- Centralised decision maker
 - Influence of project appraisal literature
- “Hard” adaptation options (e.g. climate proofing infrastructure)
 - Easier to cost, especially in negotiating context (e.g. Forthcoming WB study on adaptation costs)

In reality adaptation involves

- Multiple agents interacting
 - Incentives for “autonomous” adaptation
 - Distorted market signals
- Importance of policy to coordinate adaptation activities
 - “Hard” options have incentive effects that affect adaptation decisions (especially where there are public good effects or externalities)


Example: Sea level rises and coastal policy

- **Retreat, Accommodate, Protect?**
 - Land values drive damages and thus optimal mix of policy
- What are **private** incentives for adaptation?
 - Pricing of risk – affects location decisions (e.g. “sea change” effects in Australia)
- Market failures
 - Incomplete information; missing markets for risk
 - Externalities, including agglomeration effects
 - **Non excludability and non rivalry (“public goods”) associated with “protect” options**
- Public good effects and “protect” options
 - Moral hazard effects (socially sub-optimal risky behaviour).
 - Potential damages are endogenous (c.f. flood protection in Australia)

Example: Sea level rises and coastal policy (cont)

- Policy framework required to address these “principal-agent” issues
 - Affects analysis of costs and benefits
 - Risks of skewing policy towards protection options, aggravated by institutional factors:
 - Sensitivity to “stranded asset arguments”
 - Inability for government to pre-commit against ex-post compensation
 - Importance of cost-sharing and cost-recovery mechanisms

Building adaptation policy from the bottom-up



Concluding observations

- Many of the suggested elements draw on existing good public policy practice
 - Impacts of climate change will exacerbate impacts of existing market failures and policy-induced distortions
 - Correcting these distortions can represent “no-regrets” options
- Implementation will stretch existing analytical techniques, e.g.
 - Modelling agent responses to incentives under incomplete information
 - Bounded rationality and institutional constraints
- Equity/ distributional effects

Tex

Tex

Tex

Tex

Tex

Tex

Tex

Tex



frontier
economics

FRONTIER ECONOMICS PTY. LTD.
BRISBANE | MELBOURNE | SYDNEY

Frontier Economics Pty Ltd, 395 Collins Street, Melbourne, Vic 3000
Tel. +61 (0)3 9620 4488 Fax. +61 (0)3 9620 4499 www.frontier-economics.com